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Abstract 
 
‘Skolkovo’ innovation city near Moscow is Russia’s latest high-profile manifestation of a policy shift 
towards diversification and innovation based growth. This paper aims to understand the 
institutional, historical and comparative contexts at an early stage when implementation in Skolkovo 
has just begun. It also aims to analyse the opportunities and challenges offered by Skolkovo in a 
comparative perspective by using a framework that evaluates Skolkovo’s early developments in 
terms of the extent it can contribute to a Russian system of innovation. We aim to demonstrate the 
value of academic discourse in policy issues, arguably an indispensable input into the ex-ante 
evaluation of state modernization projects. Our argument is that Skolkovo is meant to be a de facto 
‘mission oriented innovation eco-system’ which is quite a new type of challenge for Russia. We 
outline the broad systemic obstacles facing Skolkovo as well as the opportunities for its growth.  
  
Keywords: innovation, Skolkovo innovation city, Russia, technological modernization, Schumpeter, 
growth theory, proximity, interactions 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Some men see things as they are and ask why. Others dream things that never were and ask why 
not.’  
--George Bernard Shaw (1856 – 1950), quoted by Steve Geiger, COO of Skolkovo Foundation, in his 
presentation ‘Innovations Model’ at the Skolkovo Roadshow, Institute of Directors, London, 
February 20, 20121 
 
Launched in 2010, Skolkovo is the latest high-profile manifestation of a policy shift of Russia towards 
diversification and innovation based growth. This paper aims to understand the institutional, 
historical and comparative contexts at an early stage when implementation in Skolkovo has just 
begun. At first glance, this may seem premature but we believe that our analysis is interesting not 
only for Skolkovo’s managers but also for a broad policy and academic audience.2  We want to 
explore whether the assumptions underpinning the objectives of Skolkovo are backed by historical 
and comparative evidence. By expanding the debate from a narrow Russian and investment context 
to include broader historical and comparative perspectives, we aim to demonstrate the value of 
academic discourse in policy issues. We consider this to be an indispensable input into the ex-ante 
evaluation of such an important modernization project for Russia. 
 
The Skolkovo project forms part of a broader political agenda to modernise the country’s economy, 
political system, and society. This latest modernization project began in earnest in 2007 when the 
Ministry of Economic Development started to develop a federal, long-term strategy on social 
andeconomic development to 2020, which aimed to make Russia an innovation and knowledge 
based economy by focusing the country’s development on the long-term national priorities of 
dynamic economic development, better quality of life, national security, and strengthening Russia’s 
global position (Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, 2008). Many experts from Russia and 
abroad, however, have criticised this long-term program because of its promotion of innovation over 
imitation of technologies: they argue that a country behind the technological frontier, such as 
Russia, needs to first imitate new technologies and processes in order to reach the frontier level 
before innovation makes sense (Connolly, 2011, p.452). The political support for economic 
modernization and innovation increased during Medvedev’s presidency (2008-12) when he 
repeatedly stressed the need for modernization to reduce Russia’s dependency on natural resources 
and drive sustainable economic growth. His 2009 speech to the Federal Assembly outlined the 
state’s new 5 priority spheres in science and technology as energy efficiency, telecommunications, 
space technologies, nuclear energy, and pharmaceuticals. Medvedev added nanotechnology to this 
                                                          
1
 Geiger resigned as Chief Operating Officer of Skolkovo Foundation in December 2012. 
2 The paper draws on a workshop ‘Russia's Skolkovo in Comparative and Historical Context’ which 
was held at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London (UCL) on 
Wednesday June 13, 2012. A summary of the workshop and podcasts of the 4 sessions of the 
workshop can be accessed here. 
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list soon after in 2009 and a state corporation, ‘Rosnano’, was formed in 2011 to implement the 
state’s policies on nanotechnology (New Europe Brussels, 2009; EBRD, 2010, p.138).3 
The importance of Skolkovo stems from vastly different views on prospects for modernization of 
Russia. From an optimist’s perspective, the increase in macroeconomic, political, and social stability 
since the turn of the 21st century has generated many pockets of vitality in the Russian economy 
(IMF, 2012, p.15; Adelaja, 2012, pp.26-8). On the other hand, pessimists point out that capital flight 
is rampant and administrative barriers to growth are high (Aslund 2007; ERBD, 2012; Åslund, Guriev 
and Kuchins, 2010). In view of such divergent assessments, understanding the context matters and 
hence Skolkovo cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger socio-economic landscape of Russia. 
Moreover, diverging views are due to the nature of social change which emerges through the 
accumulation of micro projects by actors who seek to challenge incumbents and dominant practices. 
It is inevitable that actors’ views on this process will significantly differ. We hope to minimize these 
biases by exploring the issue in comparative perspective and by confining ourselves to the design of 
Skolkovo with limited analysis of implementation issues. 
 
This paper aims to analyse the opportunities and challenges offered by Skolkovo and the extent to 
which it can contribute to strengthening Russia’s system of innovation. It is hoped that by examining 
successful cases of innovation clusters in countries that, like Russia, have somewhat deficient 
institutional frameworks, some issues and conclusions can be drawn which may be relevant for 
Skolkovo. In addition, we believe that our conclusions are relevant for countries undertaking or 
planning similar modernization projects. 
Specifically, we want to address the following questions: 
• How do the present Russian policies on innovation compare with previous efforts to 
modernise via science & technology? 
• How does Russia’s innovation policy compare with other emerging economies and 
‘advanced’ economies? 
What are the chances of success for a top-down innovation project such as Skolkovo that is 
directed and governed by an authoritarian political system and is created as an enclave? 
                                                          
3
 In his speech at a national forum on nanotechnology in October 2009, President Medvedev 
emphasized that Russia must reduce its national economic dependence on oil exports and reorient 
towards technology-based growth. 
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The importance of Skolkovo is broader and stretches well beyond its boundaries. Namely, Skolkovo 
is an expression of a view also strongly present in more developed countries, whereby supporting 
innovation via new technology based firms (NTBFs) is believed to be a key driver of growth and 
structural change (European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2010; WEF, 2011). Hence, the lessons from 
Skolkovo may have broader implications that go well beyond Russia and other so called ‘emerging 
economies.’ The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section (section 2) 
presents briefly Skolkovo’s origins, development, goals, governance, and structure. Section 3 
outlines the theoretical perspective and reviews the empirical research on the relationship between 
economic growth, innovation and the role of ‘science cities’ within which the Skolkovo case can be 
understood. Section 4 discusses the opportunities that Skolkovo offers to be a catalyst for innovation 
development across the rest of Russia, while section 5 then highlights the challenges Skolkovo faces. 
Finally, section 6 offers three broad conclusions.  
 
2 ON SKOLKOVO 
 
Skolkovo is an innovation centre about 20km west of the centre of Moscow city, called Russia’s 
‘Silicon Valley’ by the world’s media (although this impression may be wrong as its employees do not 
in fact see Skolkovo as such). Operational since 2010, it is perhaps the most high-profile 
manifestation of policy shift in Russia towards diversification and innovation-based growth. It is 
designed to be a fully-functioning city where scientists, researchers and entrepreneurs can live, work 
and interact. A French architecture firm won a contract to design the buildings and landscape, and 
construction began in the summer of 2012 on land formerly used for cucumber farming. 
The origins of Skolkovo are interesting because it was started and became operational so quickly. 
Brief discussions between three key political actors on the idea of Skolkovo in the context of 
Medvedev’s political and economic modernization agenda preceded Skolkovo’s official ‘birth’ in the 
spring of 2010. These figures were Dmitry Medvedev, then President of Russia, Arkady Dvorkovitch, 
presidential advisor in the presidential administration, and Vladislav Surkov, First Deputy Chief of 
Staff to the President and known as the ‘grey cardinal’ of the Kremlin at the time.4 Skolkovo came 
into existence in the spring of 2010 with the creation of the Skolkovo Foundation, the governing 
body for Skolkovo. Victor Vekselberg, an oligarch and owner and president of a large Russian 
conglomerate, Renova Group, is the President of Skolkovo Foundation and co-chair of the Skolkovo 
Foundation Council. The first components of Skolkovo innovation city have been operational since 
early 2011. We argue that such high-level support was critical to Skolkovo becoming a reality 
relatively quickly: the necessary presidential decrees and laws on Skolkovo were signed off within 6 
months of its creation (Federal Law No. 244 ‘On the innovation centre of Skolkovo’, September 28, 
2010). 
Skolkovo aims to be a physical and virtual ‘cluster’ to promote technological innovations and to 
provide high quality infrastructure, human capital and a corporate environment that will together 
help to encourage technological innovations.  
                                                          
4
 Interview with Artyom Morozov, adviser at Skolkovo Foundation, June 18, 2012, held in Skolkovo Foundation 
office, Moscow. 
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According to the Vice President for International Partnership Development in Skolkovo Foundation, 
the mission of Skolkovo is four-fold (Lenihan, 2012): 
 Diversify the Russian economy through innovation and entrepreneurship;  
 Integrate Russian science and technology into the global economy; 
 Develop human capital through world-class research; 
 Nurture competitive knowledge-based companies. 
Skolkovo conceptualizes itself as a new ‘ecosystem’ of innovation ( 
 
Figure 1). In addition to providing funding and other support to start-ups, it will encourage 
multinational companies to locate some of their research and development (R&D) in Skolkovo, 
provide financial and political incentives to businesses to relocate to the site, offer a world-class 
graduate education in business and entrepreneurship, and support the development of fundamental 
and applied science across Russia by fostering a pan-Russian network to unite existing centres of 
science across Russia and large state companies. The managers of the city of Skolkovo are keen to 
foster interactions between the businesses, students, and researchers – a key element of an 
ecosystem as interactions can stimulate demand for innovations. This demand is not known in 
advance but rather discovered through interactions by private firms, government bodies, and 
researchers. Skolkovo’s conceptual model as an innovation ecosystem makes it fundamentally 
different from the Soviet model of R&D and innovation, which focused on high spending on specific 
technologies that were needed by specified, known users (primarily, the military).5 Skolkovo aims to 
become ‘the basis for a vast ecosystem that spans all of Russia and brings together researchers, 
entrepreneurs and investors in five ‘clusters’ (The Economist, 2012). These five clusters include IT, a 
sector where Russia has strong capabilities both historically and currently, as well as biomedical 
science, energy-efficiency, space and nuclear technologies. The five areas of science are also the 
national priority industries in the short to mid-term. The ecosystem of Skolkovo, its champions hope, 
will help Russia modernise its economy. 
 
                                                          
5
 The issue of Skolkovo’s model of innovation is discussed more in section 3 of this paper. 
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Figure 1. Skolkovo’s ecosystem 
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Source: (Lenihan, 2012) 
In addition to a physical presence in a specific territory, it will also exist in the virtual sphere because 
it plans to connect with other innovation centres in different parts of Russia and to be the hub for a 
‘pan-Russian network’ of science that incorporates former closed cities and state companies 
(Lenihan, 2012).  The planned innovation city of Skolkovo is very well-financed. In 2010, the year of 
official approval and the start of construction, it received 3.9 billion roubles or approximately USD 
122 million or GBP 76 million (Rossiskaya Gazeta, 2010).6  In addition, in August 2013, the 
government of Russia announced that the Skolkovo Foundation would receive 135.6 billion more 
roubles (approximately USD 4.1 billion or GBP 2.6 billion) from the federal government between 
2013 and 2020, ending months of uncertainty about its future amid allegations of corruption.7  
It is worth mentioning that data on actual investments and operational expenditures of Skolkovo are 
hard to find as such information is not publicly available, so we can only rely on Russian and 
international media sources. These media sources give very different estimates. Moreover, 
researchers and commercial firms based in the UK and other Western European and North American 
countries are partnering with Skolkovo. This should further increase estimated investments and it 
shows that the international community is interested in developments in innovation in Russia. 
 
                                                          
6 Currency exchange rates as of January 1, 2014, and according to www.xe.com 
(http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=RUB&date=2014-01-01). 
7For more information on the corruption allegations concerning Skolkovo, see section 5.5 of this 
paper. 
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In summary, the main organizations that form the Skolkovo hub ecosystem are: 
I. Skolkovo innovation centre: 
- Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (SkTech) for graduate education; 
- Corporate partners: 
- These include large international companies such as Siemens (German origin), Nokia 
(Finnish origin), IBM (American origin), Johnson & Johnson (American origin), Tata 
(Indian origin), and Boeing (American origin). As of January 2013, 24 large corporate 
have signed up to be a part of Skolkovo. 
- Large Russian companies including Lukoil (oil), TNK-BP (oil), Sistema (large multi-
industry conglomerate), Sberbank (banking), Rosatom (nuclear energy), and Renova 
(strategic investment). 
- Siemens, for example, has just over 200 employees engaged in R&D based in 
Skolkovo. The company chose to do some of its global R&D in Skolkovo, because of 
the opportunity to be part of a governmental project and hence to build a working 
relationship with government officials.  
- Infrastructure for startups (clusters, a technopark which – from 2014 – will provide 
supporting infrastructure for new, innovative companies and assist in commercializing new 
technologies). These new companies should be new technology-based firms (NTBFs), which 
are commonly defined as particular types of small and medium sized enterprises that are 
more innovative in developing or using new technologies and newer than a ‘typical’ firm 
(OECD, 1998, p.219); 
II. Skolkovo Foundation Board of Trustees 
1. 15 top Russian politicians and bureaucrats (its members include three representatives of 
the Presidential Administration, four Ministers, the President of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Mayor of Moscow, head of the Association of Innovative Regions of Russia, the 
general director of the Russian Venture Company, and the Chairman of the State 
Corporation ‘Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs’ (Vneshekonombank);8  
2. Chaired by Prime Minister Medvedev; 
3. The is de facto the highest decision-making body of Skolkovo; 
4. It meets once per year to review performance (in combination with the Foundation 
Council) and to approve the most major investment decisions.  
 
III. Skolkovo Foundation Council (Board)  
1. The Council is like a corporate board of directors and meets quarterly to approve 
budgets, review performance (together with the Board of Trustees), and to approve 
major investments (if not subject to Board of Trustees approval); 
2. 17 members who have senior positions in the Russian government and the Russian and 
global private sector, of whom 11 are Russian men and 6 are men from other countries; 
                                                          
8
 Information correct as of October 2, 2014. Available at: 
http://community.sk.ru/foundation/team/p/popechsovet.aspx  
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3. The Council is co-chaired by Craig Barrett (Retired CEO/Chairman, Intel Corporation) and 
Victor Vekselberg (President of the Skolkovo Foundation); other members include John 
T. Chambers (Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Cisco Systems, Inc.), Eric E. 
Schmidt (Executive Chairman  of Google Inc.), Suresh Prabhu (Chairperson, Council on 
Energy, Environment and Water, India), and Esko Aho (Prime Minister of Finland, 1991-
95, and Executive Chairman of the Board, East Office of Finnish Industries Ltd).9 
 
The members of the Skolkovo Foundation Board of Trustees and Foundation Council are, by some 
accounts, less engaged than could be expected from the board of a start-up. A start-up board aims 
to actively support and give guidance to the new company rather than simply approving budgets and 
decisions.10 
 
IV. Scientific Advisory Council 
 
1. This council sets priorities for R&D at Skolkovo and is comprised of leading Russian and 
international scientists; 
2. Consists of 27 leading scientists of which 10 are from outside Russia.11 
 
V. Skolkovo Foundation 
Skolkovo Foundation is the body governing the innovation centre of Skolkovo. It is 
responsible for constructing and managing Skolkovo innovation centre, attracting talented 
researchers via offering grants, benefits, and simplified bureaucratic procedures, etc. 
 
VI. Skolkovo Industrial Advisory Board (IAB) 
The IAB is a feedback mechanism for major companies 
 
VII. ‘Greater Skolkovo’ 
 
While not formally part of the Skolkovo innovation city, there is another private organization with 
the same name located in the same part of Moscow city – the Moscow School of Management 
SKOLKOVO. This has led to some confusion in the media about the exact composition of Skolkovo 
innovation city. However, this business school is not part of the state-run Skolkovo. Nevertheless, 
because of similar aims and the potential to be a powerful component of Skolkovo’s innovation 
ecosystem we include brief information about it here.    
 
                                                          
9
 Information correct as of October 2, 2014. Available at: 
http://community.sk.ru/foundation/team/p/foundationboard.aspx 
10
 Anonymous interview, June 2012, Moscow. 
11
 Information correct as of October 2, 2014. Available at: 
http://community.sk.ru/foundation/team/p/konsultsovet.aspx 
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1. Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO. As a privately funded and run business 
school designed to compete with the world’s top business schools, it is organizationally 
and physically separate from the innovation centre Skolkovo. It is located 4km away 
from the site of Skolkovo innovation centre by foot (although by car or public transport 
it is 10km away due to the absence of a direct road between the management school 
and innovation centre).12 The school of management has existed since September 2006 
(the date of a ceremony to lay the foundation stone on the future site) and accepted its 
first students on the Executive MBA course in January 2009. It is the brainchild of a team 
of senior Russian and international business leaders, with the support of top-level 
politicians including Putin and Medvedev. Its president is Ruben Vardanian, in whose 
words the school aims to: "…create a new educational centre in Moscow that will train 
leaders and entrepreneurs for emerging markets and that will be known for its innovative 
approach to teaching." (The Times, 2008). 
 
3 ECONOMIC GROWTH, MODERNIZATION AND SCIENCE CITIES 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the ultimate aim of the Skolkovo project is to foster Russia’s 
technological modernization and thus ensure the basis for long-term growth based not solely on its 
natural resources. The most appropriate current theoretical perspective on R&D, innovation and 
growth is Schumpeterian growth theory (Aghion & Howitt, 1992). This perspective can be useful to 
understand the possible effects of Skolkovo on modernization and growth in Russia.  
According to Schumpeterian growth theory, R&D is not necessarily a direct source of growth but can 
lead indirectly to growth due to the interaction effects between R&D and other (institutional) factors 
(Aghion, 2004). Unlike in endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1993) what matters is not only the 
intensity of R&D but also the probability of R&D leading to innovation, and the extent to which 
innovation is likely to contribute to productivity growth (Aghion, Harmgart & Weisshaar, 2011). 
Interactions between R&D, innovation and productivity are affected by institutional context which 
should differ depending on the position of the country in relation to the technology frontier. Thus, in 
the Schumpeterian growth model technological progress (and growth) is a result not just of R&D but 
of R&D in combination with other factors such as competition, property rights, financial 
development, education, and macroeconomic stability. 
The Schumpeterian paradigm introduces the idea of a technological frontier which represents the 
forefront of knowledge and the latest technologies that exist globally. A country’s or firm’s progress 
differs according to how far it is from the frontier. Countries or firms behind the frontier should grow 
faster and catch up to the global technological frontier because they benefit from knowledge 
spillovers from those on the frontier. Firms or countries behind the frontier can imitate technological 
activities, whereas those at the frontier must continually innovate to stay in that position. Moreover, 
policies and institutions that favour imitation are not the same as those that favour leading ‐ edge 
innovation (Aghion, Harmgart & Weisshaar, 2011). 
                                                          
12
 According to online map tool offered by the Russian language search engine yandex, http://maps.yandex.ru. 
Last accessed September 20, 2012.  
10 
 
Insights from Schumpeterian growth theory can be applied at a micro level, looking not at a whole 
industry but at specific kinds of firms – NTBFs. Skolkovo aims to attract such firms in the belief that 
they promote growth. Based on the insights from Schumpeterian growth theory, a plethora of other 
factors and processes should be in place to ensure the positive effects of NTBFs on growth. A good 
example of the complex link between R&D and growth are the debates about the so-called 
‘paradoxes’: situations where a country has a high R&D input but low innovation output such as the 
European paradox (Dosi, Llerena & Labini, 2006) and Swedish paradox (Bitard et al., 2008). There are 
also mismatches between poor innovation effort and good economic performance, such as the 
Norwegian puzzle (OECD, 2007; Koch, 2007). In the past, there have been countries with good 
science and poor economic performance (e.g. UK) or vice versa (e.g. Japan). Recently, Coad and Reid 
(2012) defined the ‘Scottish conundrum’ as a country with a strong higher education research sector 
but poor R&D innovation output (like Sweden) and with ‘hidden innovation’ but without dynamic 
growth (the opposite of Norway). These examples suggest that the links between R&D, innovation 
and growth are not trivial and need further exploration. 
 
This theoretical and empirical insight has strong relevance for Skolkovo. It suggests that the success 
of Skolkovo– both in its own right and as a catalyst for innovation and modernization more widely 
throughout the country –depends not only on investment in R&D and the creation of NTBFs but also 
on the extent to which these NTBFs have indirect effects on growth. In fact, evidence suggests that it 
is unrealistic to expect NTBFs to become high growth firms. A strand of literature on firm dynamics 
suggests that firm growth is essentially a random walk (i.e. due to  chance) , and that it is not 
possible to target high growth firms. Evidence from the UK, US, Finland and Korea shows that high 
growth firms are found in a wide range of sectors and across all regions (BERR, 2008; Rigby et al, 
2007) and that there is no link between high technology sectors and high growth firms (Rigby et al, 
2007; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). 
Many governments of OECD countries have long supported NTBFs in particular over large firms, 
believing that they help commercialise new knowledge, help bring about structural change in 
product markets and contribute to increasing the skill level and mobility of labour (OECD, 1998, 
p.219). However, disappointment about the expected roles of NTBFs in many countries has begun to 
emerge recently (Coad and Reid, 2012). There appears to be a strong mismatch between the 
assumptions of technology policy about these firms and their true nature. In reality, these firms are 
actually well established corporate spinoffs, not start-ups. They do not undertake large amounts of 
in-house R&D, do not have intellectual property rights (IPR), many are not growth oriented, and they 
derive their competitive advantage from the knowledge of users or customers (see for evidence, 
Brown and Mason, 2014; and Radosevic, Savic & Woodward, 2010; Radosevic, 2011 in the context of 
Eastern Europe).   
A new perspective argues that it is an innovation ecosystem rather than NTBFs or large firms per se 
that are driving innovation. In other words, large firms (such as Apple) interact with small technology 
based firms (such as software companies developing apps for Apple products) which innovate based 
on large firms’ stable technology platforms (Mandel, 2011, p.6). 
What role might NTBFs play in Skolkovo? They could be potential high growth firms, which is what 
Skolkovo is trying to achieve through its technopark and grants to start-ups. However, as research 
shows high growth firms are not necessarily high tech firms and the capacity of policy or a state 
11 
 
modernization project to target such firms is expected to be quite low. An alternative objective 
would be to think of NTBFs as new actors in a Russian industrial and knowledge system which can 
foster structural change and productivity growth through linkages with other firms. NTBFs may not 
be high growth firms themselves but act as knowledge suppliers to other firms i.e. as specialised 
suppliers.  
This does not mean that NTBFs cannot arise exclusively on the basis of radical innovation nurtured in 
Russia. However, this rarely seems to happen, especially if policies aim to target such firms. In fact, 
the expectation that NTBFS in science based areas may become a source of growth of value added 
and employment is not consistent with new evidence which shows that the innovation patterns in 
small firms are more diverse than generally believed (De Jong and Marsili, 2006). They can play an 
important role in innovation but much less as a direct source of innovation. Rather, science-based 
small firms can play important roles in interacting with suppliers and customers by responding to 
suppliers’ proposals (Pavitt, 1984) or by being customer driven i.e. relying on understanding 
customers’ needs as a source of their innovations. Science-based small firms use knowledge from 
universities and research institutes as a source of innovation, but they also draw heavily on 
customers’ needs (De Jong and Marsili, 2006). Overall, the majority of NTBFS are not a direct and 
independent source of growth, but rather an indirect source of new knowledge, employment and 
value added. They require a market (users) for the new technologies produced, which is what Russia 
and many other CEE countries lack. In the context of CEE, NTBFs are only one of three generic types 
of firms which would be better methodologically defined as knowledge intensive enterprises 
(Radosevic, Savic & Woodward, 2010). 
Territoriality (spatial proximity) is considered to be one of the drivers of innovation. Proximity 
facilitates the interaction of people and organisations, especially in contexts where exchange of tacit 
knowledge and informal communication are crucial ingredients of the innovation process. Yet spatial 
proximity is just one of several kinds of proximity. Building on the work of French scholars in the 
1990s, Boschma (2005) argues that there are five important aspects of proximity that can enable or 
constrain innovation processes and learning, depending on the context: 
i) cognitive – meaning absorptive capacity to take in new ideas; 
ii) organizational – meaning the degree of shared relations, autonomy and control 
within an organizational arrangement (e.g. ‘on-the-spot’ market, joint venture, or 
hierarchically organized firm); 
iii) social – the socially embedded relations between agents at a micro level; 
iv) institutional – socially embedded relations between macro-level institutions; and 
v) geographical – the ‘spatial or physical distance between economic actors, both in 
its absolute and relative meaning’. 
 
He summarises these dimensions and the possible problems that can arise from too much or too 
little proximity, as well as the ways to overcome these problems (Boschma, 2005, p.71). Insufficient 
proximity may lead to opportunism, misunderstanding and lack of externalities while too much 
proximity can lead to different types of lock ins, lack of novelty and inertia. Following Boschma, we 
can say that geographical proximity can help learning and innovation but it is neither enough nor 
necessary. Cognitive proximity is always needed in addition to geographic closeness, and the other 
kinds of proximity can replace geographic proximity to solve problems of coordination. Thus, 
12 
 
Skolkovo needs to find the right balance between different proximities: too little and there may be 
problems of misunderstanding, opportunism, or no spatial externalities or spillovers; equally, too 
much proximity could cause problems such as no new ideas or knowledge, too much bureaucracy, 
no economic rationale, lock-in, inertia, or lack of openness. Skolkovo may be able to overcome a lack 
of geographic proximity, caused by the geographic spread of firms and residents across Russia. 
However, it could only achieve success in innovation growth with the presence of other forms of 
proximity too (such as organizational, cognitive, social or institutional). 
 
The innovation studies literature suggests that Skolkovo by itself will not be the driver of growth by 
itself but could indirectly contribute to growth by interacting with the rest of the Russian innovation 
system and economy. International links are there to ensure world excellence and flow of new ideas 
and fruitful interaction with national R&D. Skolkovo’s NTBFs should be one of several inputs into 
technology based economic growth of Russia and should crucially operate as specialized suppliers. 
The formation of NTBFs is only one way by which projects like Skolkovo can contribute to 
technological modernization and economic growth. In fact, the primary objective of Skolkovo should 
be ‘to become the basis for a vast ecosystem that spans all of Russia’ (The Economist, 2012) rather 
than to generate NTBFs. The rich experience of the science and technology cluster that developed in 
Cambridge, UK from the late 1970s shows that R&D firms often contribute to the regional economy 
not by making new products, but rather by providing knowledge-intensive business services, 
especially R&D contract services (Probert, Connell & Mina, 2013). So instead of expecting Skolkovo 
firms to extract value from their research through direct commercialization of their S&T, their major 
contribution could be R&D services. In that respect, Skolkovo’s aims are multifaceted and include 
the diverse possible impacts of R&D on the economy and national innovation system. 
Salter and Martin provide a useful way to think about the variety of mechanisms by which Skolkovo’s 
R&D efforts can affect growth (2001). They distinguish six ways R&D can contribute to economic 
growth: 1) increasing the stock of useful knowledge; 2) training skilled graduates; 3) developing new 
instrumentation and methodologies; 4) creating networks and promoting social interactions; 5) 
increasing capacity for problem solving in technological and scientific fields; and 6) creating new 
firms. NTBFs in Skolkovo may be successful in indirectly triggering growth through one or more of 
these mechanisms. 
Skolkovo may contribute to growth by increasing the stock of useful knowledge, i.e. by improving 
excellence and international integration of Russian R&D system. Through helping to create new 
technologies – defined not only as technological hardware but also tacit knowledge, techniques, and 
methods for design and development – opportunities for knowledge spillovers (transfer) across the 
Russian economy arise. Researchers attached to Skolkovo move to other organizations, maintain 
existing affiliations or carry out joint projects with researchers in other places in Russia or abroad. In 
this way, we would expect to see two-way knowledge exchanges and creation, both from and into 
the innovation centre. 
Moreover, Skolkovo has set itself ambitious targets to train skilled graduates. The new Skolkovo 
Institute of Science and Technology (SkTech) has been set up to provide graduate education, 
modelled on and with an operational partnership with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) in USA. It aims to integrate research, education, innovation and entrepreneurship around the 5 
broad research clusters of Skolkovo innovation centres. By the time its research and education 
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programmes get up and running (in 2013 as a pilot year and from 2014 fully operational), SkTech 
aims to have 15 research centres (each with 3-4 labs), 1200 graduate students and 300 postdoctoral 
students, and world-class international faculty, researchers and industrial partners (Lenihan, 2012).13 
SkTech thus has the potential to contribute to Russia’s economic growth. However to achieve this 
goal some important conditions must be met. Students or researchers at Skolkovo would need some 
incentives to stay in Russia for work or further study in order for Russia’s economy to benefit from 
their skills and knowledge; recent trends indicate that a high proportion of Russia’s graduates and 
postgraduates leave Russia in search of better opportunities (EBRD, 2012, p.63). 
New or mature firms based in Skolkovo could help fuel growth through being networkers. In this 
sense, they would help to create the networks and social interactions which Salter and Martin (2001) 
claimed can lead to growth. There are certainly many firms (941 resident companies including a few 
dozen foreign firms as of early August 2013) that have already signed up to the Skolkovo initiative.14 
In addition, SkTech and the school of management provide ‘clusters’ of researchers and students, 
while the Foundation Board, Foundation Council and Advisory Council provide channels for 
politicians, bureaucrats and international leading scientists to provide their inputs and interact with 
the other actors of the new Skolkovo ‘ecosystem’ of innovation. This mass of firms, researchers and 
others gives the potential for networking and interactions. However, as firms are not obliged to have 
a physical office on the Skolkovo site just outside Moscow they may decide not to relocate their 
employees to Skolkovo and instead just take a grant (if a start-up) or cooperate with Skolkovo 
virtually or for marketing purposes. In other words, there is scope for opportunism which should be 
countered by incentives for commitment.  
Initially, Skolkovo may seem to be a mission-oriented mechanism and a top-down enclave based on 
the linear innovation model logic. However, this view is too simplified and neglects the fact that the 
main objective is to create an ‘innovation eco-system’ which by definition requires element of 
diffusion policy. In this respect, Skolkovo can be considered as a project between mission and 
diffusion oriented initiatives (Ergas, 1986). Hence, it seems more appropriate to define Skolkovo as a 
‘mission oriented innovation ecology’ which is historically quite a new challenge for Russia. As 
pointed out by Loren Graham (2010) ‘mission oriented initiatives of the past (nuclear weapons, 
launching a satellite into space) had ‘a sharply focused goal, so sharply focused that the Russians 
knew exactly when they had reached it’. This is much less possible for Skolkovo which aims to be a 
hub for a ‘pan-Russian network’ of science that incorporates former closed cities and state 
companies.  
Several other factors make Skolkovo an even more new and challenging project whose outcomes are 
of great relevance not only for Russia but also for many emerging economies, especially CIS 
countries. 
                                                          
13
 Information also taken from Skolkovo official website in 2012, http://community.sk.ru/news/, last accessed 
September 26, 2014  
14 The number of innovative start-ups has increased rapidly from 368 in February 2012 to over 860 in 
March 2013 and the majority of start-ups (approx. 33%) are in the IT cluster (Skolkovo official 
website, last accessed March 22, 2013). By August 2013, the number of resident companies had 
risen to 941, including a few dozen foreign ones (Kouzbit, 2013) 
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We may expect much stronger structural constraints of a ‘technologies push’ project such as 
Skolkovo in relatively unfavourable ‘framework’ and institutional conditions. The enclave approach 
seems to be the natural first step to influence the landscape of Russian S&T which still largely 
operates as a post-Soviet R&D system (Radosevic, 2003). Like any other national S&T policy, Russian 
S&T policy cannot fully compensate for deficient framework conditions. Often, the key solutions lie 
not in narrowly-focused S&T and innovation policy but in the broader economic reforms in ‘non-
technological’ areas such as entrepreneurship and the business environment. Mechanisms of 
‘creative destruction’ or industry dynamics in Russia are still weak and are compounded by weak 
market demand for knowledge intensive services. A developed innovation and technology policy is 
indispensable for changing unfavourable framework conditions but its effects may be too weak 
when confronted with strong rent-seeking opportunities from natural resources based sectors. 
On the other hand, we should not neglect the potential of initiatives like Skolkovo, Rusnano and 
research universities, coupled with the growing export of Russian software. These may generate a 
momentum of their own and create pockets of growth in Russia, independent of natural resources. 
If these niches of new modes of growth could link up and reach a critical mass, this may generate 
alternative growth regime in Russia. There may be some potential for these changes to generate 
new linkages in the Russian innovation system, which at present is characterised by a lack of 
interactions between the main pillars of the ‘triple helix’ model (university-industry-government 
relations) – the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Universities, government, and industrial 
institutes (for example, Leydesdorff & Meyer, 2006). Some scholars prefer to label the Russian and 
Ukrainian innovation systems, for example, as ‘double helix’ to reflect the lack of linkages between 
government, industry and academia (Dezhina, 2013; Yegorov & Koretsky, 2013). In addition, 
Skolkovo has the potential to become a hub of international networking, which thus can deepen 
international R&D networking and sourcing and potentially help establish linkages in knowledge-
based activities between foreign firms and domestic firms. 
While Skolkovo is often heralded as Russia’s own Silicon Valley, it may be more appropriate to 
compare Skolkovo with initiatives in countries that, like Russia, have deficient institutional 
frameworks. Some countries have created relatively successful innovation clusters or ecosystems 
based on the model of Silicon Valley despite the predictions of economic or innovation theories. 
Such theories often emphasise – usually drawing on empirical evidence from Western European 
countries and the USA – a decentralised, cooperative industrial system as important for successful 
innovation. For example, Silicon Valley’s success relative to Boston’s Route 128 has been attributed 
to the former’s decentralised, cooperative industrial system: the extent and nature of social division 
of labour, the extent and nature of links between customers, suppliers, and competitors in a sector 
or sectors, and internal firm organization (firm’s degree of horizontal coordination, decentralization 
and allocation of responsibilities and task specialization). Regional institutions and culture (such as 
universities, business associations, professional societies and local governments) are also important 
and interact with firms in the region (Saxenian, 1996, p.7-8). At a national level, different aspects of 
governance and public policy (institutional setting, character of arenas, ways of setting priorities, 
allocation procedures, regulation and cultural orientation) were shown to be very relevant to the 
differing innovation performance of Germany and the USA (Kuhlmann & Shapira, 2006). 
In contrast to such theories, there are countries that have – or had in the recent past – relatively 
weak institutional frameworks but which have succeeded in created ‘local innovation clusters’. 
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These include Taiwan (in the 1980s), South Korea (in the 1970s), and China in 1990s/2000s (Radelet 
and Sachs, 1997; Ozawa, 2009). Their successes are based on enclaves: confined localities with 
favourable institutional and economic conditions which would have been impossible to introduce in 
the entire economy. 
 
More generally, a variety of external and internal factors for supporting innovation should be in 
place for projects like Skolkovo. Firm-specific and the wider conditions for firm innovation in the UK 
are well depicted in, for example, a recent study by NESTA, the UK’s innovation foundation. Factors 
internal to firms include talented managers (with international experience) and managers who have 
experienced failure. In addition, the study also mentions the importance of external factors such as 
good infrastructure (for example, access to fast internet), access to finance and skills, public 
research, competition, and demand for innovation (Miles et al, 2009). 
 
External factors of innovation include, in addition to sources of potential demand and markets for 
knowledge-intensive services (KIS), favourable institutional and resources linkages, such as skilled 
professional networks and funding sources for different stages of the innovation process. Demand 
for innovation is a crucial factor that is lacking in most CEE and CIS countries. Demand for new 
technologies is complex and does not automatically come from an increase in market demand but 
rather depends on the size of firms, firms’ strategies and the organisation of the economy; in other 
words, technological demand is ‘derived demand’ (Radosevic, 2011, p.368). 
 
Figure 2 below shows an assessment of the factors of demand and supply for R&D and technology in 
Russia. Although based on a subjective assessment of factors by the business community in Russia, it 
confirms that Russia – similar to other post-socialist economies – tends to have a relatively greater 
supply of research, technology and development than demand i.e. they have supply surpluses and 
demand gaps. 
 
Figure 2. Research, technology and development (RTD) supply and demand in Russia 
 
Source: http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/ 
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Note: Figure 2 shows averages for a set of demand and supply indicators for each year from 2006 to 
2012. Demand is measured as average assessment in each year of the following indicators: extent of 
orientation towards customers, firm’s technological absorption level, sophistication of buyers, 
sophistication of production process, extent of staff training, capacity for innovation, firm’s R&D 
spending and government procurement of advanced technologies. Supply is measured as the 
average assessment in each year of the following indicators: availability of scientists and engineers, 
quality of maths and science education, local availability of specialised research and training services, 
quality of scientific research institutions, quality of education and quality of education system. 
 
 
4 OPPORTUNITIES OF SKOLKOVO 
In this section, we discuss the opportunities that Skolkovo innovation centre presents and examine 
the extent to which it could be a catalyst for innovation development across Russia. The 
opportunities of Skolkovo include resources (both tangible and intangible), its openness and 
transparency, enclave nature (separation from the rest of Russia), and finally, its strong state and 
government support.   
4.1 Resources 
First, Skolkovo aims to provide to resident companies and scientists financial resources and land. The 
government of Russia committed USD132 million to Skolkovo in 2010 (3.9 million roubles), which 
represents a sizeable 0.007% of Russia’s GDP (World Bank, 2011).15 By the end of June 2012, almost 
£160 million (US$247 million or 8,110 million roubles) has been approved to be distributed via 135 
grants. As of the summer of 2012, about 25% of the 400 start-ups in Skolkovo have received a grant. 
400 hectares of land has been set aside for Skolkovo, about 20km to the west of Moscow in Moscow 
region – a region where available land is scarce for the level of demand (Skolkovo official website, 
2012). As of early 2012, the master planning for the city had been completed and construction  
begun. The first part of the city is planned to be ready in 2014. The rapid mobilisation of such large 
quantities of financial and land resources is an impressive achievement, which is due in large part to 
the authoritarian political system characterised by a high concentration of power held by the most 
senior politicians (President and Prime Minister) in Russia. It is a particularly rapid mobilization of 
resources when compared to the time required to launch a similar initiative in a Western democratic 
country, where bargaining and negotiations between the political executives, parliament and state 
agencies can drag on for several months or years.  
Second, a resource that Skolkovo can provide to its tenants is access to the market, both Russian and 
international. By bringing international and Russian companies (large companies and start-ups) 
together in one physical and virtual space, Skolkovo aims to facilitate interactions in the market. 
Providing market access is therefore critical to encourage technology-based competition. For foreign 
companies, Skolkovo may be a potential facilitator in accessing Russian markets. Equally, Russian 
                                                          
15 Based on GDP figures from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Russia’s GDP (current 
US$) was US$1.858 trillion (USD 1,858,000,000,000) in 2011 (World Bank, 2011) 
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companies are hoping that this may be a way to get access to MNCs that decide to cooperate with 
Skolkovo. Yet, these things are much less possible to implement by decrees because they are largely 
in the hands of market actors and a variety of other interests in Russia. Overall, it is too early to say 
whether Skolkovo is succeeding in expanding corporate access to Russia’s domestic market. 
There is some evidence that Skolkovo is beginning to implement its promises of facilitating access to 
Russian government officials. This links to the issue of market access for foreign firms as – even after 
Russia’s long-awaited accession to the WTO on August 22, 2012 – market access in Russia is largely 
connected to informal institutional issues related to the operation of specific markets. 
The Skolkovo Industrial Advisory Board (IAB) is a mechanism for major companies to give their 
feedback and opinions to government officials. The IAB meets three times a year and consists of 
around 10 people from the Skolkovo Foundation Council and from the government. The success of 
the IAB as a mechanism is somewhat assured by the fact that top-level political figures have 
supported Skolkovo since its inception. Nevertheless, the IAB has some challenges which it must 
overcome if it is to prove effective operationally and in terms of policy. Operationally, there are 
questions about which government officials would be part of the IAB. Will these be junior or senior 
level officials? How will they be appointed to the IAB? Will their tenure on the IAB be for a fixed 
term? Moreover, regarding policy formation even if government officials listen to businesses’ 
concerns voiced at the IAB meetings, will the officials be obliged to follow up on the concerns? 
Third, Skolkovo has the potential of providing access to new knowledge created within its tenant 
companies. Although it is too early to assess the long-term results, some indications can be seen. In 
the first 6 months of 2012, start-ups attached to Skolkovo submitted 45 applications for intellectual 
property (utility patents, trademarks and software patents) across all 5 cluster areas of research ( 
Table 3 below). The IT cluster was by far the most active in submitting applications: this cluster 
submitted 25 applications (11 to register a trademark, 8 to acquire a utility patent, and 6 to acquire a 
software patent). In contrast, the 4 other research clusters only submitted 6 or 8 applications each.  
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Table 3. Applications for intellectual property from Skolkovo-registered start-ups, January - June 
2012 
Results for January - June 2012 IT Energy Biomed Nuclear Space Total
Submitted: 25 6 8 6 0 45
Applications for utility patents, 
incuding Russia and 
international
8 5 7 6 0 26
Applications for registration of 
a trademark
11 1 1 0 0 13
Applications for software 
patents
6 0 0 0 0 6
Concluded patent searches 5 6 4 0 8 23
Received applications for the 
preparations of IP assets
13 15 12 3 0 43
Prepared applications for IP 
objects
9 8 7 3 0 27
Skolkovo cluster
 
Source: Skolkovo official website (2012). 
 
Fourth, Skolkovo aims to concentrate and thus enable access to critical number of researchers. 
Skolkovo Foundation is actively trying to recruit Russian scientists who are studying for higher 
degrees or working abroad. Skolkovo Foundation managers hope that by concentrating researchers 
and scientists in one geographic place and by facilitating interactions between them, Skolkovo will 
facilitate interactions between companies (both established and start-ups) so that knowledge can 
flow more freely. This is encouraging for attracting talent yet the question remains how Skolkovo 
plans to attract real talent and how it defines real talent. 
The Foundation is marketing Skolkovo as a place where Russian talent can have access to many 
opportunities (financial and physical labs/offices for experiments) and be protected from the 
vagaries of Russia’s bureaucracy which can often stifle creative scientific talents and innovations. In 
addition, Skolkovo Foundation has already recruited a number of international management and 
corporate experts to work in the Foundation with the idea that they will help ensure Skolkovo has an 
international orientation and becomes part of a global scientific culture. For example, the Skolkovo 
Foundation Council contains many previously mentioned non-Russian members. Similarly, 
prominent international scientists including Nobel Prize laureates Roger David Kornberg and Jean-
Mari Lehn, Siegfried Dais (Vice-Chairman, Bosch GmbH), Richard Lerner (President, Scripps Research 
Institute) sit on the Scientific Advisory Council. 
In the spring of 2012, Skolkovo was also actively recruiting researchers at a more junior level by 
offering favourable living conditions.  For example, in 2012 Skolkovo Tech advertised widely among 
the global academic communities for junior researchers with PhDs. The criteria for tenure-track and 
more senior tenured positions advertised on an academic network related to entrepreneurship in 
April 2012 included: a completed PhD in either a field connected to the ‘organizational aspects of 
technological innovation and entrepreneurship’, or ‘in natural sciences or engineering with an 
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outstanding record of research and teaching in a field related to organizational aspects of 
technological innovation and entrepreneurship, and active involvement in practical innovation and 
entrepreneurship activities.’ In addition, further criteria include ‘… abilities to collaborate across 
disciplinary boundaries, and investigate applied research problems, have a commitment to 
education and desire to work with innovation and entrepreneurship communities within and outside 
Skolkovo Tech (Entrepreneurship Research & Policy Network, 2012a). 
 
However, identical positions were re-advertised on the same website in late July 2012 which 
suggests that they did not receive adequate or suitably qualified applicants in the first 
announcement three months earlier (ERPN, 2012c). Moreover, generous and internationally 
competitive compensation was included in the July 2012 advert – something missing from the April 
advert. This indicates that Skolkovo Tech was prepared to provide more incentives to entice 
excellent researchers: 
 
‘REMUNERATION: Compensation packages are aligned with the best international standards 
in the field. Travelling and research funds, as well as relocation provisions for singles and 
families are an integral part of the package.’ (ERPN, 2012c). 
 
Furthermore, in 2012 Skolkovo Tech was also recruiting for an Entrepreneurship & Innovation 
Education Program Manager. This position aimed to help in the ‘development of a comprehensive 
education program and curricula at the Skolkovo Tech in support [of] SkTech's Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation mission and strategic initiatives.’ They hoped to recruit somebody with 3-5 years of 
practical experience in educational development or a related field, and a PhD (or equivalent) or 
Master's Degree in natural sciences, engineering, science or engineering education (ERPN, 2012b). 
 
 
4.2 Openness and transparency 
Skolkovo presents another opportunity via the self-proclaimed emphasis on openness, both 
internationally and in its business model. This culture of openness and transparency, as seen for 
example in the management’s pledge to put much information online in the public sphere, is a 
departure from Soviet model of science and innovation. Moreover, Skolkovo seeks foreign partners. 
SkTech is a private, graduate teaching university that will be a key part of Skolkovo innovation centre 
and has signed a partnership with Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the USA. SkTech 
hopes to learn from the experience of MIT and in some way replicate MIT on Russian soil. It aims to 
educate 1200 graduate students, recruit around 300 postdoctoral researchers, and recruit 200 
professors, the latter ‘appointed according to international standards and procedures’ (MIT website, 
2012). Until the construction of Skolkovo is completed and SkTech has a physical presence in 
Skolkovo, many of the graduate students and professors who have already been recruited will be 
based at MIT in the USA. 
 
Internationally, Skolkovo has formed links with the corporate world. Foreign businesses and 
companies are asked to sign an agreement to carry out some of their R&D activities in Skolkovo. For 
example, to date 19 large corporations have signed agreements to establish R&D facilities at 
Skolkovo, including Schneider Electric. The total amount of spending on research projects in 
Skolkovo to date is 21.8 billion roubles (approx. £440 million). A total of 2,219 employees are 
working on research projects run by Skolkovo’s corporate partners. For example, in late December 
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2012, Skolkovo Foundation, RUSNANO (the state-owned nanotechnology company), Rostelecom 
(the state-controlled telecommunications company), Russian Venture Company and the 
microelectronics Russian company ITFY (whose main strategic partner is IBM) signed a 
memorandum to jointly establish an electronic technology centre (Venture News, 2012). 
 
 
4.3 Global scientific culture 
For a country that for the most of its modern history had closed science, ensuring that Skolkovo is 
international and part of a global scientific culture is critical. A cultural change in Russian research 
and science is an essential part of Russia’s modernization and push for an innovative and knowledge-
based economy. Such a shift in culture is limited by the closed character of Russian and Soviet 
science (for example, co-publications and joint projects with scholars in other countries; the 
institutional separation between research and teaching in the Soviet period). The new initiatives 
related to international peer assessment and recruitment of more international faculty are 
promising steps in the right direction; they will strongly help Skolkovo develop in the mid- to long-
term. One of Russia’s newly-established ‘National Research Universities’, the Higher School of 
Economics (HSE) is indicative of these shifts: HSE has moved up from 8th to 6th place out of 1500 
universities for number of papers published in the last 12 months in the university rankings of the 
international Social Science Research Network published in August 2012 (HSE, 2012).  So, Skolkovo’s 
capacity to create a new kind of research culture (different to the present culture that exists 
elsewhere in much of Russia) and be part of a global scientific culture will be shaped by the opening 
of Russia’s R&D and higher education system. 
Table 1 below shows the planned numbers of researchers, scientists and students, and other 
residents in Skolkovo City once it is fully operational from 2014. We can see that in total there will be 
almost 45,000 people on site (Geiger, 2012). However, it is too early to assess the numbers of 
scientists and researchers brought to Skolkovo. 
Table 1. Categories of all researchers and residents in Skolkovo City 
 Numbers of people (planned) 
Total residents  10000  
Total employed  26000 
Professionals employed 6000 
Graduate students, faculty and staff 2500 
Total 44500 
 
 
4.4 Enclave nature 
Paradoxically, part of Skolkovo’s apparent attraction to foreign businesses lies in its enclave nature: 
its separation from the rest of the economy and society. This means that Skolkovo does not have to 
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overcome many of the administrative and institutional hurdles and constraints faced by companies 
and organisations elsewhere in Russia, and can thus operate more efficiently. It will not be obliged 
to comply with Russian standards. Skolkovo will be subject to its own building regulations, separate 
from the regulations in force for the rest of the country. In addition, Skolkovo will be an almost tax 
exempt, free economic zone (for example, resident companies will not have to pay profit tax or VAT, 
and companies will get a refund on any laboratory costs). The innovation city will have a certain 
amount of autonomy in the provision and management of public utilities such as water and 
electricity. However this autonomy is limited because Skolkovo will remain dependent on Moscow 
city for existing infrastructure (for example, water piped from Moscow city) and it seems unlikely 
that the planners and developers would want to spend huge sums of money to build their own 
independent infrastructure (Blyumin, 2010).16 
 
Skolkovo’s enclave feature is an advantage in country with deficient and poorly functioning 
institutional framework. However, being an enclave may also hinder the chances of Skolkovo to be 
fully open and interact with other countries and the rest of Russia and of Skolkovo becoming part of 
an effective, functioning innovation ecosystem. So, while in the early phases of its operation its 
enclave nature is an advantage, Skolkovo may not turn itself into a source of change and spillover 
effects for the Russian innovation system. We discuss this in the next section (section V).  
 
4.5 Strong state support 
As already mentioned above, the concept and implementation of Skolkovo has been led from the 
centre, directed by key political figures at the centre of Russia’s state. The fact that the Skolkovo 
project has such strong support from the state can arguably be an advantage for its future 
development. In Russia under presidents ‘Putin-Medvedev’ (2000 to present), informal rules and 
practices have more importance than formal laws and hence having a ‘friendly ear’ at the apex of 
power can be a good thing for Skolkovo. Any legal, political or bureaucratic obstacles which could 
block or stall the development of the innovation centre could be smoothed over or removed 
altogether with the assistance of senior political figures who support Skolkovo. Parallels can be 
drawn with Korea’s recent history. The experience of South Korea’s rapid industrial development 
and economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s under the military regime led by Park Chung-hee is 
well-known. The extremely successful industrial and economic growth in South Korea was coupled 
with increasingly authoritarian policies, signs of a strong state (Amsden, 1989). 
 
Like in South Korea, Skolkovo’s top-level political supporters has so far played an important 
catalysing role for the development of Skolkovo. However this top-level support could equally prove 
a weakness in the longer-term for Skolkovo as political support for grand, state projects in Russia can 
be temporary and quickly replaced by another competing project (for example, president Putin’s 
National Priority Projects in healthcare, education, housing and agriculture have been almost 
                                                          
16
  Information on Skolkovo’s autonomy in public utilities confirmed by an anonymous interview with an 
employee at Skolkovo Foundation, Moscow,  September 2012.  
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forgotten within 6 years after they were grandiosely launched in September 2005). In addition to 
potential policy inconsistencies one should recognise differences in external environment in the 
period of Korean largely domestic led modernization and today’s need for Russia to integrate itself in 
MNCs knowledge networks and thus supplements its current mode of domestic led modernization 
with links and leverages through strategic partnerships with foreign R&D organizations and MNCs. 
 
5 EMBEDDING THE ENCLAVE: CHALLENGES SKOLKOVO FACES 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the potential opportunities Skolkovo offers in the form of 
access to ample financial resources, access for companies to available talent and a mechanism of 
contact with government officials, linkages with other countries, an enclave nature, and strong state 
support. Despite the fact that the Skolkovo project only started in 2010, some worrying trends are 
evident which may undermine its success. These are ambiguous legacies of similar examples from 
the Soviet past, challenges in fostering interaction within Skolkovo firms and organizations, 
difficulties in creating mission oriented innovation eco-system, embedding enclave and the role of 
the predatory state in this process. These challenges may undermine the integration of Skolkovo in 
both the Russian innovation system and in international R&D and innovation networks.  
 
5.1 Ambiguous legacies and path dependency 
Skolkovo is an entirely new project that signifies a radical break with the transition period. However, 
it also carries strong imprints of legacies and path dependencies. It is somewhat similar in design 
(though with important differences) to previous efforts such as the Soviet Union’s closed cities, 
‘sharagas’, and science cities (Cooper, 2012). These institutional continuities include certain ‘ways of 
thinking and doing things’ – practices and institutions.  
In the Soviet Union, the state prioritised technological development and innovation by creating 
special enclaves – enclosed territories or cities isolated from the rest of the country. Essentially this 
means the state promoted innovations in a particular confined geographic area, separate from the 
rest of the society and economy and with little or no diffusion. Three partly overlapping forms of 
such cities could be discerned in the Soviet past. First, the ‘sharaga’ (special-regime enclaves) were 
one kind of enclave innovation initiated by Soviet rulers in the early 1930s: these ‘sharaga’ were 
staffed by imprisoned scientists and technical specialists and had some success in developing new 
technologies. This success may have been because they had a narrow specialisation, adequate 
financial resources and were tightly controlled. Second, science cities or towns (called ‘naukograd’ 
now in Russian) developed around strategically important research centres from the 1950s and were 
often connected to the military hence they occupied a position of relative prestige and received 
funding from the centre. Scientists were allowed to travel for research to other cities in the Soviet 
Union and, occasionally, to countries outside the Soviet Union so there was some, albeit limited, 
knowledge exchange and mobility of human capital. Science cities still exist today and have been 
quite successful in developing local concentrations of high research and scientific excellence but less 
successful in commercialisation in a market economy i.e. in translating research and scientific 
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resources into innovations. Third, closed cities (ZATO) are another historical example of an ‘enclave 
innovation’ policy, created to fulfil the Soviet state’s priorities in nuclear weapons from the 1940s to 
the end of the 1980s. Such closed cities hosted research institutes, design organizations and 
production facilities in a relatively small geographic territory. The scientists and engineers who lived 
there had comfortable lives and good standard of living; they were responsible for example for the 
development of lasers which were used for military purposes (for example, Vladimir ‘Raduga’ 
(Raduzhnyi) closed city in the 1970s). However, the closed cities lived in a regime of utmost secrecy 
(Cooper, 2012). This limited the possibilities for transfer of technology and knowledge. 
These legacies have ambiguous effects on Skolkovo which shares some similarities with the linear 
model of innovation that existed in the Soviet Union. However, it must be remembered that 
Skolkovo aims to be an ‘innovation ecosystem’ which by nature is not linear. The linear innovation 
system has been a widespread and influential model of innovation in much of the world throughout 
the 20th century (Bush, 1945; Godin, 2006 ; OECD, 1992). This model of innovation treats innovation 
as a linear process from R&D as initial inputs, to fundamental science, to full-scale production of the 
finished product and commercialisation of the product. It also focused efforts on a few specific 
technologies that had a known user (predominantly, the military). In the Cold War context, such a 
way of thinking justified large sums of money spent on R&D: policy makers argued that more R&D 
spending would automatically produce more technological innovations and thus allow their country 
to get ahead of their ideological rival in the quest for technological and economic development (for 
example, USA and former USSR). 
 
The similarity between Skolkovo and the model of innovation in the Soviet period is the volume of 
financial resources put into Skolkovo. We can deduce that political figures and government officials 
responsible for starting Skolkovo, by investing such a lot of federal funds into Skolkovo (see section 
II), view financial investments as the most critical factor in determining the success of Skolkovo, in 
line with a linear model of innovation. However, the similarities with a linear view of innovation end 
there as Skolkovo city aims to be a novel kind of ‘innovation ecosystem’, a grandiose project that will 
be both a physical hub (the infrastructure and people in the city) and a virtual hub (online network 
to connect with other centres of science and research in Russia). The designers of Skolkovo want to 
encourage interactions among scientists, researchers and employees of the resident start ups and 
large firms. Skolkovo designers and government officials probably recognise that it is a very 
challenging ambition: innovation is inherently uncertain and specific to firms. It is a collective and 
cumulative process that involves risks with no guarantee of getting rewards in return (Mazzucato, 
2011, p.34). The Soviet legacies and path dependencies are not very helpful for integrating Skolkovo 
nationally and internationally. In fact, they seem to be liabilities and new practices have to be learnt 
to that objective.  
5.2 Fostering interactions within Skolkovo city: physical and/or virtual 
proximity? 
Another challenge facing Skolkovo is how to foster and support interactions between individuals 
working in different companies that have ties to Skolkovo. A large body of literature within the 
systems of innovation approach stresses the beneficial effects of interactions and networks for 
innovation, seen for example in the form of high tech industrial regions or clusters. Finegold, for 
24 
 
example, defines the most successful clusters as ones which are self-sustaining and ‘high-skill 
ecosystems’ (Finegold, 2006, p.398; see also Edquist (ed.), 1997 and Considine, Lewis & Alexander, 
2009). 
Based on what we see so far in Skolkovo, it seems that Skolkovo already faces some obstacles in 
terms of fostering interactions although these obstacles may be mitigated if Skolkovo can build up its 
virtual network to connect entrepreneurs, scientists, and venture capitalists across Russia. One 
obstacle to interactions is the unenforced relocation by firms of their R&D to the city. Companies 
who receive a grant from Skolkovo Foundation, as well as those who have the status of ‘Skolkovo 
resident’ without a grant, do not at present have any obligation to relocate their R&D or production 
to the innovation city (The Economist, 2012, p.51). Hence, the Skolkovo Foundation needs to find 
the right balance between creating incentives (coerced or voluntary) for companies to have a 
physical presence in Skolkovo and developing a virtual network for innovation to substitute for 
physical interactions on site.  
Some insights which may be relevant for Skolkovo’s challenge of fostering interactions between 
scientists, entrepreneurs and other researchers come from another Soviet legacy: from the work of a 
Soviet philosopher (Georgiy Schedrovitsky) on collective thinking. Schedrovitsky was the head of an 
informal scientific community called the Moscow Methodological Circle. This group developed 
‘organizational activity games’ (organizatsionno-deiatelnostnye igry, or ODI, in Russian) in 1979 as a 
way to understand complex problems in a country’s economy and to organize collective thinking 
(Shchedrovitsky & Kotelnikov, 1988, p.1). The games tried to (re)organize activity or economic 
systems. In the 1980s these kinds of games became popular with games organized in many different 
towns across the Soviet Union (1989 was the peak year with over 100 games organized). These 
open, activity games were a public form of ‘critical and innovative thinking that developed outside 
the control of the governing political structures.’ (Rotkirch, 1996, p.34) In this way, they gave 
participants ‘a space for reflection.’ (ibid., p.40) Despite the emphasis on openness and reflection, 
there was still an internal hierarchy within each game: a game would always have a leader who was 
de facto ‘worshipped’ and determined the game’s structure and organization (ibid.). Examples of the 
various types of games held included games to create and develop radical innovations and games to 
solve fundamental scientific problems. For example, the town of Surgut requested a game to 
examine the problems of self-government and regional cost accounting in the Surgut region. 
The games were organized as follows. The players were a multi-disciplinary group of people 
(‘…usually physicians, city planners, designers, engineers, pedagogues or psychologists’,  Rotkirch, 
1996, p.34). The total group size ranged from 10-100 players and over the course of between 5 and 
20 days the group gathered to discuss a given problem and develop collective thinking. The idea was 
to encourage the whole group to work together and initiate collective thinking. 
To what extent are Soviet ‘organizational activity games’ relevant for contemporary Russia’s 
Skolkovo? Certainly, the games developed in a different and specific political, social and economic 
context. The games were a way for intellectuals to meet others with similar professional or social 
interests in an informal, apolitical atmosphere. They were part of the dissident movement in the 
1980s which contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union. However certain elements could be 
reproduced in Skolkovo such as the gathering of knowledgeable people to discuss a set problem, the 
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inter-disciplinarity, informality, and the encouragement of innovative ideas. Such games could help 
foster interactions among the Skolkovo community, which are important for innovation according to 
the global theoretical and empirical innovation literature. To sum up, borrowing some ideas from 
the Soviet organizational games of the late 1970s and 1980s may be a way to overcome the lack of 
physical proximity in Skolkovo. Yet to succeed as an innovation ecosystem, Skolkovo must foster and 
support the creation of regular interactions between researchers, entrepreneurs, scientists, venture 
capitalists, students, and businessmen – both in a physical sphere and virtually – because 
interactions and collaborations have often been found key for stimulating innovations. It would be 
important to enhance the 5 kinds of proximity depicted by Boschma (see section 3 above): cognitive, 
social, organizational, institutional, and geographic proximity. Finally, the role of the government in 
providing a supportive regulatory, legal, and financial environment for these interactions and 
networks is crucial. 
5.3 Forever an enclave, or how to create demand for innovation? 
There is a major challenge that Skolkovo remains an enclave. An enclave is typically a territory that is 
isolated from the rest of the country and protected from state legislative and regulatory 
requirements by being given exemption status and special privileges. Skolkovo’s success will be 
contingent on the extent it can be enlarged: in other words, how Skolkovo interacts with the rest of 
Russia and with the world. Hence, a possible outcome of Skolkovo can be the strong stream of S&T 
results coming from an area that in other respects remains an enclave.  In other words, Skolkovo 
could be a S&T success but not really an economic success in terms of economic spillovers, linkages 
and commercial results. It could become one of the excellent S&T centre in the country but not a 
source of structural change and innovation-based growth.   
While acknowledging that innovations are specific to firms, we emphasise that innovations cannot 
happen in isolation: an interactive environment is crucial. Skolkovo enclave will be highly dependent 
on technology demand from either Russian or international partners and markets. NTBFs in Skolkovo 
should become ‘specialized suppliers’ and providers of R&D services (Pavitt, 1984; De Jong and 
Marsili, 2006) rather than direct sources of new products. Specialised suppliers are a category of 
innovative firms that produce technologies which are essential inputs into other sectors. 
The ability of firms attached to Skolkovo to become any of these kinds of firms depends on whether 
they can attract the necessary talent (such as entrepreneurs with the skills and capabilities to offer 
new technologies to other companies) and also depends on the level of demand for the new 
products and processes from elsewhere in Russia and other countries. Will the many large firms in 
Russia demand the new technologies made by Skolkovo-based firms? To summarize, Skolkovo will 
require: a) entrepreneurs capable of offering new technologies to other companies; and b) 
companies in other sectors interested in buying Russian high-tech components, services or 
technologies. 
5.4 Beyond mission versus diffusion-oriented technology policies: mission 
oriented innovation eco-system? 
The linear model of innovation was more inclined to foster ‘mission-oriented initiatives’ than 
diffusion oriented initiatives. Ergas (1986) distinguishes between mission oriented (or ‘technology 
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push’) and ‘diffusion-oriented’ technology policies. Examples of countries with preferences for the 
former kind of policies in science and technology include the USA, UK, France and Russia: they set 
clear national goals as targets, and their policies encourage radical innovations to meet their 
national priorities. In contrast, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden for example exhibit technology 
policies which are mainly diffusion-oriented: they have more decentralised technology policies 
which Ergas argues are more successful for a gradual and incremental adaptation to change because 
they spread technological capacities throughout the country’s industrial structure. 
Mission-oriented initiatives certainly predominated in the Soviet Union. For example, the state had 
clear goals in the field of nuclear weapons. In addition, in space technology the Soviets wanted to be 
the first to launch a satellite into space. What about in Russia today: do mission-oriented or 
diffusion-oriented technology policies predominate? The long-term socio-economic development 
strategy to 2020 № 1662 that was passed in 2008 sets out the state’s priorities to modernize the 
country and make it an innovative, globally competitive, and leading country by 2020. Thus the 2020 
strategy document is an example of how innovation is closely tied to the state’s priorities. Turning to 
Skolkovo, the five research clusters (energy, IT, nuclear, space, and biomedical science) around 
which the innovation centre functions mirror the state’s national priorities, so in this sense it is 
another example of a mission-oriented policy. At the same time, however, Skolkovo aims to be a 
large ‘innovation ecosystem’ that will cover not just the physical site near Moscow but also 
incorporate and link with all regions of Russia via the virtual sphere. Creating an ‘innovation 
ecosystem’ requires elements of diffusion-oriented policies, so this is something Skolkovo would 
need to incorporate in its quest to be an innovation ecosystem. To summarize, we argue that 
Skolkovo is trying to develop a ‘mission-oriented innovation ecosystem’. This means that its 
objectives are shaped by the state’s priorities in science and technological innovation (the five 
research clusters) and by a wish to create a physical and virtual space that reaches out to other 
centres of scientific excellence and innovation in Russia. 
 
5.5. The problem of the predatory state and corruption 
Two other challenges for Skolkovo to overcome are the ‘grabbing hand’ of bureaucrats and other 
officials, and the risk of corruption from within Skolkovo. These challenges risk undermining 
Skolkovo’s openness and transparency, which we discussed above (section four) as sources of 
potential success for the innovation city. First, officials, often those in the lower levels of Russia’s 
vast bureaucracy, can get big personal gains at the expense of the large sums of public funds 
transferred to Skolkovo. Second, employees of the various organisations part of the Skolkovo project 
may have incentives to siphon off some funds for personal gain. 
Indeed, throughout 2013, various English and Russian language media outlets reported on 
allegations of corruption at Skolkovo which surfaced as part of an audit by Russia’s Investigative 
Committee and a later inquiry by the Prosecutor General’s Office. For example, in mid-February 
2013, two managers in the Skolkovo project (Kirill Lugovtsev, former director of the finance 
department of the ‘Skolkovo Foundation for New Technologies Development and Commercialisation 
Centre’, and Vladimir Khokhlov, general director of the customs-finance company ‘Skolkovo’) were 
accused of embezzlement of funds equal to nearly USD800,000 or 23.8m roubles (Radio Free Europe 
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Radio Liberty, 2013). Other examples surfaced between February 28, 2013 and March 1, 2013. Four 
leading Russian daily broadsheets (RBK Daily, Izvestia, Vedomosti, Kommersant) published reports 
about alleged corruption at Skolkovo in that period. No criminal case has been opened yet about 
these latest allegations which are threefold: 
1. Alleged money laundering concerning the transfer of federal funds totalling 3.5 billion 
roubles - intended for Skolkovo - from the state budget to a private bank. Investigations 
centred on the fact that this money appeared to sit in an account of the bank for a long time, 
and that the ultimate owner of this bank (Metkombank) is Viktor Vekselberg, who is also the 
president of Skolkovo Foundation. Skolkovo publicly denied any wrongdoings, saying these 
financial transfers to Metkombank were returned last year, and a vice president in Skolkovo 
Foundation said that the transfer was made in 2010 because Skolkovo is a non-state 
foundation and cannot receive state funds directly; 
2. Alleged transfer of a 400 million rouble grant from Skolkovo to an organisation that is not 
legally allowed to receive such grants which ar eaimed at Skolkovo resident firms (a vice-
president of Skolkovo Foundation later said that the recipient of this grant was SkolTech 
university and so this transfer was in accordance with the 2010 federal law on Skolkovo); and 
3. Alleged transfer by a daughter organization of Skolkovo (the Foundation for New 
Technologies Development and Commercialization Centre) of more than 37 million roubles in 
2011 to subcontractor organizations for work done without contracts (Izvestia, 2013; RBK 
Daily, 2013; Kommersant, 2013; Vedomosti, 2013).  
 
Later accusations emerged in the media based on the inquiry by the Prosecutor General’s Office. In 
October 2013, the prosecutors claimed that the Skolkovo management had overpaid for some 
services, such as promotional videos (paid 54 million roubles, whilst the real cost stated by 
prosecutors was 5 million roubles or less) and consulting services (for which Skolkovo paid 600 
million roubles whereas the alleged real cost was 200 million roubles). In addition, the prosecutors 
claimed that Skolkovo gave grants through ‘shadow schemes’ which issued funds to ‘allegedly 
fictitious’ companies or firms affiliated with Skolkovo, some of which were located in offshore zones 
(The Moscow Times, 2013). 
 
Of course, it could be that these allegations are unfounded and part of the state’s attempt to 
undermine Skolkovo. The state is not a homogenous entity and so even though Skolkovo is a state-
led project, some government officials or bureaucrats could be jealous of Skolkovo’s generous state 
support and wish to sabotage its success. For example, in its article published on March 1 2013, 
Vedomosti quoted the first deputy chair of the Duma Committee for science and technology, Dmitry 
Novikov (member of Russia’s Communist Party), as saying that ‘Skolkovo has been a mistaken project 
from the beginning, the resources…should have gone to existing science centres instead’ (Vedomosti, 
2013). Some observers have commented that ‘these investigations are part of an ongoing feud’ 
between the law enforcement agencies, known to be anti-liberal and hardliners, and the more 
liberal officials led by Medvedev (The Moscow Times, 2013). It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
explore further whether these allegations are true or not. They only suggest that a grand project 
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such as Skolkovo cannot be insulated from informal practices, including potential criminal 
allegations, prevalent in Russia.  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Skolkovo is an impressive large scale, state-led effort to technologically modernise and diversify 
Russia by establishing a potential new source of knowledge generation and innovation development. 
As can be expected, this initiative has already got widely differing reactions, ranging from sceptics to 
strong supporters.  
In this paper, we examined Skolkovo’s design and objectives and briefly touched on its early efforts 
largely in a broader comparative perspective. We are sceptical regarding the capacity of academic 
inquiry to give any kind of ex-ante definite verdicts on such modernization projects. However, 
academic analysis could be an important input into ex-ante policy evaluation of such important 
modernization attempts. We see its value primarily in providing a framework and thus generating a 
range of questions and issues which can drive ex-ante policy analysis. With this in mind we offer 
three provisional conclusions.  
First, Skolkovo represents the realisation of political will held by some of Russia’s top policy makers 
to shift their country towards a trajectory of technology-based growth. In essence, it is a wish to shift 
the sources of growth and comparative advantage away from natural resources (like oil and gas) 
towards value-enhancing domestic R&D capabilities and market oriented innovation. Russia is 
currently classified as a country with growth based on efficiencies in standard technologies rather 
than a country with innovation-driven growth (see WEF, 201217; and Radosevic, 2011). However, a 
strategic shift towards growth based on innovation strongly depends not only on the political will 
and skilled management of Skolkovo’s ‘ecosystem’ but even more on whether the requirements for 
technology-based competition exist in Russia. This assumes not only institutional requirements in 
terms of respect for property rights, including IPR, but even more on sophisticated demand from 
both export and local markets. The multiple technical interdependencies in new products and 
processes require certification and standards, after sales services, and warranties. Barriers to growth 
are related to technological knowledge and also marketing. Local firms competing in technology 
need affordable access to a sound technical infrastructure and finance to upscale production. In 
short, the issue is (in the language of new structural economics, see Lin, 2012) whether Skolkovo is a 
comparative advantage-following (CAF) or comparative advantage-defying (CAD) project. If Skolkovo 
is too isolated from Russia’s latent comparative advantages, there is the danger that the gap 
between what Skolkovo as a future knowledge hub and technology broker can offer is far too distant 
from the rest of Russia’s economy: disembodied enclave that will achieve S&T but not economic 
results. Equally, industrial upgrading of Russia is a moving target as many Russian companies are 
going global and medium size companies seem to be emerging as a dynamic segment, which may 
generate demand for sophisticated knowledge services and niche technologies.  
                                                          
17
 According to the World Economic Forum (WEF) 2012-2013 report, Russia is ranked 67 out of 144 countries 
(2012-13) in the Global Competitiveness Index, a composite index of 12 main blocks of which one is 
innovation. Russia’s position in this index has fallen in recent years from 63
rd
 in 2010-11. 
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Second, the novelty of Skolkovo is that it is a de facto mission oriented attempt to create an 
innovation ecosystem. In that respect, its success cannot and should not be measured by the number 
of NTBFs, patents or similar discrete items alone but measured more through criteria like training of 
skilled graduates, international knowledge networking and capacity of Russian S&T networks to 
integrate globally into MNCs and public R&D networks of other countries. NTBFs should not be seen 
as a direct source of gross value added or jobs but rather as specialised suppliers, science-based 
firms, customizers, technology brokers and knowledge providers. This is inherently difficult. There is 
a risk that Skolkovo becomes a place where multinationals carry out their R&D activities, benefiting 
from the capabilities and scientific and technical knowledge that remain in Russia, but does not 
benefit Russia. In this respect Skolkovo may become a successful exclave rather than enclave. MNCs 
can then export these benefits overseas rather than help to create a networking hub for Russian 
firms in specialized knowledge based niches and technologies. This process may not be balanced and 
is overloaded with risks. Indeed, it will take some time for local R&D and technology demand from 
non-oil and gas sectors in Russia to emerge and reach a critical mass. 
Third, Skolkovo is a litmus test for whether Russia’s political economy is able to tolerate and 
generate a shift from a hitherto largely domestically-controlled modernization towards a pattern of 
integration of domestic R&D and innovation capacities into innovation networks of MNCs and 
international public R&D projects. This shift is a cultural change which should be promoted by the 
country’s top leadership more than it has in the past. Skolkovo has the opportunity to capitalize on 
its newly-forming international linkages with researchers, students and international firms to 
promote a global scientific culture within Russia. Skolkovo should help Russian science and 
innovation be a part of this scientific culture, and assist Russia to incorporate global standards of 
excellence and bring in new ideas and skills. However, this requires a favourable broader 
environment to signal that such cultural change is welcome and incentivized. 
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